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There is certainly a reason for eliminating the distinction between the assignment
of perfected and inchoate liens. Prominent among modem business techniques is
the practice of assigning the right to payments under a contract to a banking
facility. In this way the assignor obtains capital necessary to meet current require-
ments which would not otherwise be available to him. A secured debt is more
valuable because the risk assumed by the assignee is reduced. The very essence of
mechanics' lien laws is to afford the suppliers of labor or material security for the
debt owed them for their contribution.2 7 Yet the beneficianes of the law are often
unable to realize an important advantage of this security-its value on assignment
of the debt.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1193.1(a) allows a claim of lien to be filed
only when all work is completed or all material furnished. Thus, one who requires
cash to continue or complete his contribution to an improvement on real property
is unable to file a lien and must assign his unsecured right for a less advantageous
discount rate. If the entire purpose of mechanics' lien laws is to assure payment
to the laborer or matenalman, would not this end be~more fully attamed if the
intended beneficiary of the law were able to receive from his assignee more nearly
the amount to which he would be entitled if no assignment were necessary?
The constitution28 specifies certain classes for whom mechanics' liens must be
made available. It does not abridge the right of the legislature to exercise its
power to broaden the field of recipients beyond those named.29 There is then no
reason why the legislature may not extend the right to file a lien to the assignee
of a debt, when the assignor had such a right.
The mechanics' lien law of California should be amended to include a section
dealing with assignment of liens. This section should specifically allow the assign-
ment of a right to a lien as well as a perfected lien. Adoption of such a pro-
vision would also necessitate an amendment of Code of Civil Procedure section
1193.1 (j) to allow the assignee to file such a lien. Timothy McFarland*
27 Cases cited note 21 supra.
2 8 
"Mechanics, matenalmen, artisans, and laborers of every class, shall have a lien
upon the property upon which they have bestowed labor or furnished matenal for the
value of such labor done and material furnished; and the Legislature shall provide, by
law, for the speedy and efficient enforcement of such liens." CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 15.
20 "The court is of the opinion that the constitutional provision designating the
persons entitled to liens does not give a lien to contractors or subcontractors, as
such . ... His right to a lien under the contract is given solely by the statutory
provisions in his behalf. The constitution does not provide for him as contractor or
subcontractor." Miltimore v. Nofziger Bros. Lumber Co., 150 Cal. 790, 792, 90 Pac.
114, 115 (1907).
* Member, Second Year Class.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 1193 OF THE
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Until recently there has been a conflict in the California cases as to the con-
stitutionality of section 1193 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section requires
subcontractors and materialmen to give property owners and contractors a notice
fifteen days prior to filing a mechanics' lien, but excludes from -the requirement
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laborers and persons under direct contract with the owner.1 This is one of a series2
of statutes providing for the enforcement of mechanics' liens pursuant to the con-
stitutional mandate that creates the right to liens on property for "mechanics,
materialmen, artisans and laborers." The statute was declared unconstitutional in
Reliable Steel Supply Co. v. Croom4 and Hellen v. Stephenson,5 but was upheld
in Alta Bldg. Material Co. v. Cameron.6 The holding of the last named case was
followed, and the previous cases specifically disapproved, by the California Su-
preme Court in Borchers Bros. v. Buckeye Incubator Co.7
Two difficult legal questions arose under these conflicting cases. First, in estab-
lishing enforcement procedures for mechanics' liens, is it within the legislature's
power to discriminate between two classes that are granted equal standing by the
California constitution? Second, if this is a proper exercise of legislative power, is
section 1193 unconstitutional as an arbitrary and unreasonable classification violat-
ing the equal protection clause of the federal constitution s and provisions of the
California constitution guaranteeing uniform operation of laws?9
Legislative Power
Reliable Steel Supply Co. and Hellen were based primarily on Miltimore V.
Noftziger Bros. Lumber Co.10 The latter case was concerned with Code of Civil
Procedure section 1194 which then provided'! that proceeds of the lien fore-
closure sales should be applied to each class of liens in order of its rank, and gave
preference to laborers over materialmen. The court, with three justices dissenting,
held that the statute was unconstitutional in that it impaired the materiahnan's
right to a lien and destroyed the equal standing between laborers and materialmen.
It declared that "the constitution is self-executing to the extent that it confers
upon these classes of persons a lien, and makes them equal in point of rank with
regard to each other,"12 and it laid down the rule that the legislature cannot dis-
I CAL. CODE Civ. Poc. § 1193(a) provides in part: "Except one under direct
contract with the owner or one performing actual labor for wages, every person who
furnishes labor, service, equipment or material for which a lien otherwise can be
claimed under this chapter, must, as a necessary prerequisite to the validity of any claim
of lien subsequently filed, cause to be given not later than 15 days prior to the filing of a
claim of lien a written notice as prescribed by this section, to the owner or reputed
owner and to the original contractor. ... "
2CAL. CoDE: Civ. Pnoc. § 1181-1203.1.
3 CAL. CONsT. art. XX, § 15.
4 181 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 831, 5 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1960).
5 197 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 863, 18 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1961).
6202 Cal. App. 2d 299, 20 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1962).
759 Cal. 2d 234, 379 P.2d 1, 28 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
8 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
9 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 11, art. IV, § 25.
10150 Cal. 790, 90 Pac. 114 (1907).
11 The preferences provided in CAL. CODE Crv. Pnoc. § 1194 were excluded by
amendment, Cal. Stat. 1911, ch. 681, § 8, at 1318; this section was repealed by Cal.
Stat. 1951, ch. 1159, § 4, at 2558.
12 150 Cal. at 792, 90 Pac. at 115.
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criminate between classes to the extent of preferring one right to another when
the classes are given equal standing by the constitution.
The Miltimore rule does not prohibit procedural legislation which discriminates
between classes established as equals by the constitution. The court in Reliable
Steel Supply Co. found that Miltimore established the rule against discrimination
in respect to substantive matters. Alta Bldg. Material Co. recognized the funda-
mental difference between the statute considered in Miltimore and section 1193.
Miltimore was concerned with a statute which created a preference for laborers
over materialmen and clearly impaired the materialman's lien.' 3 Section 1193
established a procedural requirement which did not impair the substantive rights
created by the constitution.
Clearly the function of the legislature is to obey the constitutional mandate
by providing for the "speedy and efficient" enforcement of liens.1 4 In an early
leading case it was declared that article XX, section 15 is not self-executing and
is inoperative except as supplemented by legislation.15 Miltimore does not con-
travene this rule. 16 The legislature, within the limits of reasonable discretion, must
provide for the exercise of the right -to a mechanics' lien, the manner of its exer-
cise, the time at which it attaches, and the time within which it can be enforced.' 7
Thus, the court in Botchers Bros. disapproved Reliable Steel Supply Co. and
Hellen and stated that there is "no constitutional compulsion for uniform treat-
ment'1 8 and that the legislature can adopt one procedure for enforcement of liens
of materialmen, and another for laborers, it if so chooses.
Whether the Miltimore rule is called a substantive or procedural rule, how-
ever, it cannot be ignored. It still prohibits the legislature from discriminating
between materialmen and laborers to the extent that their substantive rights to
a lien are rendered unequal, even if that is done by procedural requirements.
Material suppliers' primary objection to section 1193 is that it imposes burdens
which impair their right to a lien under practical circumstances.' 9 They complain
that the short time required for notice and the difficulty of obtaining the necessary
information required for giving notice make protection of their rights to liens very
difficult in practice. Thus they raise the question as to whether section 1193
burdens the materialman to such an extent that his right to a lien is rendered
inferior to that of a laborer.
The purpose of section 1193 was to establish a simple procedure which would
protect all the interests affected by mechanics' liens.20 It requires that subcon-
Is 202 Cal. App. 2d at 302, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 715, where the court says in construing
the Miltimore decision: "It is evident that the court had in mind the constitutional
requirement that special laws shall not be passed authorizing the impairing of liens....
14 Nofzinger Lumber Co. v. Soloman, 13 Cal. App. 621, 110 Pac. 474 (1910).
15 Spinney v. Griffith, 98 Cal. 149, 32 Pac. 974 (1893). See also Chesney v. Byram,
15 Cal. 2d 460, 101 P.2d 1106 (1940), which defines a self-executing constitutional
provision as one which supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right given may
be enjoyed and protected.
11 Ferger v. Gearhart, 44 Cal. App. 245, 186 Pac. 376 (1919).
17 Barr Lumber Co. v. Shaffer, 108 Cal. App. 2d 14, 20, 238 P.2d 99, 103 (1951).
18 59 Cal. 2d at 238, 379 P.2d at 3, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
19 SENATE JUrnCmrRY CoMMr. FOR INTRIM 1957-1959, Fn-M PRnocnzss REPoRT To
LEGISLATuRE 33-34 [hereinafter cited as FiFY- Paoamss REPoRT].
2 0 FnrH PRoGEss REPORT 88.
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tractors and materialmen give notice of their intention to file a claim of lien within
fifteen days after the owner files notice of completion.21 The notice must give
information as to the general nature of material, labor or equipment supplied, the
name and address of the claimant, and the name of the party who contracted for
the material. The requirement can be satisfied by simple invoice in most cases,
and it seems that most responsible firms would have such information. The notice
must be sent to the owner and general contractor, whose addresses can be found
from the building permit. If no building permit is available the notice can be sent
to the job site.22 The net effect is to require the materialman to initiate proceed-
ings to perfect his claim of lien fifteen days prior to the time a laborer must take
such steps. Also, to secure his lien, the materialman must spend more time, greater
effort, and greater expense than the laborer. The requirements do not seem to be
impractical or unreasonable. The materialman has sufficient time to give notice,
and the additional expense can be shifted to the owner as a general operating
expense. The substantive right to a lien is not impaired, nor is the materialman's
right rendered inferior to that of the laborer.
The material suppliers also protest that section 1193 aids the general con-
tractors and home owners at the expense of materialmen and subcontractors 3 But
that objection has no bearing on the constitutionality of section 1193 and should
be directed to the legislature. The Borchers Bros. and the Alta Bldg. Material Go.
cases recognize that implicit in the constitutional mandate is the requirement that
the legislature protect the interests affected by mechanics' liens.24 It was said in
Borchers Bros. that the "constitutional mandate of article XX, section 15, is a
two-way street, requiring a balancing of the interests of both lien claimants and
property owners."25 The court construed the words "speedy and efficient"2 6 in the
constitutional provision to mean that the legislature should provide for a speedy
remedy for payment of liens, but that it should also provide that the property
owners' title should be cleared as soon as possible, to protect its marketability.
Thus, not only is the legislature empowered to create a different classification
from that specified in the California constitution, but the classification it did create
was one which carried out the objectives of the constitutional mandate.
Reasonable Classification
Generally, laws must operate equally upon all who are similarly situated in
respect to such laws.2 7 The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
21 CAL. CODE CIv. P1oo. § 1193.1(b) requires all claimants other than general con-
tractors to file their claims for liens within thirty days after the owner files notice of
completion. CAL. CODE Cnv. PRoc. 1193(a) requires notice of intention to file claims of
liens fifteen days before the claim is filed. Therefore the pre-lien notice must be given
within fifteen days after notice of completion in order to protect the claimant's right to
a lien.
22 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1193(c).
2 3 Fn-nH PRoGREss REPORT 97.
24 See also Diamond Match Co. v. Sanitary Fruit Co., 70 Cal. App. 695, 701, 234
Pac. 322, 325 (1925).
25 59 Cal. 2d at 238, 379 Pac. at 3, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
26 CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 15.
27 Western Indemnity v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 698, 151 Pac. 398, 403 (1915).
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tion provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."28 The California constitution contains various provi-
sions which provide similar, but not identical, guarantees of equal protection and
conformity of legislation.29 Despite the variance in language of the provisions of
the California constitution, where the charge is that equal protection is denied,
the effect of both constitutions is the same.30
Both constitutions prohibit unreasonable discrimination between persons who
are similarly situated with respect to the law.s ' However, they do not prohibit
reasonable classification for the purpose of meeting different conditions naturally
requiring different legislation. 2 Any discrimination between classes must be based
on some real difference between classes,33 and the differences must have sub-
stantial relation to the purpose for which the classification was designed.3 4
The legislature has wide discretion in making a classification, and its decision
will not be overthrown by the courts unless "palpably arbitrary and beyond
rational doubt erroneous."3 5 When a legislative classification is questioned, if any
state of facts can be conceived that would sustain it, there is a presumption of
the existence of that state of facts, and the burden of showing arbitrary action
rests upon the one who assails the classification. 3
Reliable Steel Supply Co. found that there were insufficient grounds for dis-
crimination between laborers and materialmen, and held the statute to be an
arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination against materialmen. Hellen approved
Reliable Steel Supply Co. and also observed that subcontractors' claims generally
are composed primarily of labor costs, yet they must act to protect their liens in
fifteen days, while laborers are still allowed thirty days. Thus, the court found
that the exemption of laborers from the statutes requirements was unreasonable
and arbitrary.
The two courts failed to recognize the important differences between the
classes designated in section 1193 and the relation of the classification to the
purpose of the statute. In order to be proven arbitrary and unreasonable, any
classification must be shown to have no substantial relation to the reasonable
28 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
29 "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." CAL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 11. "The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following
enumerated cases, that is to say: . .. (33) In all other cases where a general law can
be made applicable." CAL. CoNsT. art. IV, § 25.
30 Los Angeles County v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 2d 378, 390, 196 P.2d 773,
781 (1948), appeal denied, 336 U.S. 929 (1948); People v. Western Fruit Growers, 22
Cal. 2d 494, 506, 140 P.2d 13, 20 (1943).31 Los Angeles County v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., supra note 30, at 393, 196 P.2d
at 783.
s2 Pacific Gas & Elee. Co. v. Moore, 37 Cal. App. 2d 91, 98 P.2d 819 (1940).
83 Serve Yourself Gas Stations Ass'n v. Brock, 39 Cal. 2d 813, 249 P.2d 545 (1952);
Department of Mental Hygiene v. McGilvery, 50 Cal. 2d 742, 754, 329 P.2d 689, 695
(1958).
34 Frost v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 278 U.S. 515 (1929); Walnut Creek
v. Silveira, 47 Cal. 2d 804, 811, 306 P.2d 453, 456 (1957).
85 Sacramento Municipal Util. Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 684, 693,
128 P.2d 529, 535 (1942).
30 Cases cited note 30 supra.
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purpose of the legislation, 7 and not to be founded on a natural, intrinsic, and
constitutional distinction.38
The specific purpose for which section 1193 was enacted was to eliminate
double payments which had been plaguing property owners in Southern Cali-
fornia.3 9 Considerable controversy arose as to the solution to this problem, and
section 1193 was a compromise bill. Essentially the plan was that homeowners
and contractors were to be informed of claims of which they had no direct source
of information. These were claims of subcontractors and materialmen, with the
most acute problem presented by claims of material suppliers of subcontractors. 40
The double payment problem arose when either general contractors or subcon-
tractors became insolvent and were unable to pay for materials, equipment, or
labor supplied to construction. Contractors often paid their subcontractors and
then discovered that there were unknown claims which resulted in liens on the
property. The solution was to require these unknown claimants to give notice of
their intention to file a lien. Homeowners and contractors could then work out
some arrangement with claimants before the lien attached, thus avoiding double
payment or a cloud on the owner's title.
The court in Alta Bldg. Material Co. points out that section 1193 creates two
classes of lien claimants: (1) those who are either under direct contract with the
owner or performing actual labor for wages, and (2) all others. This classification
was based on the purpose of the statute, and the two classes stand in a different
position with respect to the statute. The owner usually would be aware of the
potential claims of those who perform actual labor for wages on the property and
those with whom he contracts directly, but he is not likely to be aware of those
who furnish materials or supply the labor of others.
Furthermore, materialmen's and subcontractors' claims were the primary cause
of the double payment problem. Laborers are given protection under the Labor
Code which provides penalties for non-payment of laborers.41 Also the average
uninformed laborer would have much less opportunity than materialmen or sub-
contractors to comply with the statute.
It seems that the Alta Bldg. Material Co. and Borchers Bros. cases properly
hold that section 1193 does not make an unreasonable discrimination between
classes. The classification it creates is based on differences in the classes that are
reasonably related to the purpose of the legislation. A statute is presumed to be
constitutional, and section 1193 is by no means palpably arbitrary and erroneous
beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether it is a practical solution to the problem of
double payments is a question not for the courts, but for the legislature.
Thomas A. Campbell*
87 Sacramento Municipal Util. Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 684, 693,
128 P.2d 529, 534-35 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 759 (1942). See Tussman & ten
Broek, Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAriF. L. REv. 341, 345-46 (1949).
38 Cases cited note 30 supra.
39 FmF PROGRESS REPOrT 24.
40 Id. at 57, 96.
41 CAL. LAon CODE § 215.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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